The failure to prevent civil war in Yugoslavia ought to prompt a rethinking of Western policy, not only towards Yugoslavia but also towards the Soviet Union and revolutionary transformations in general.

Western policy-makers have been conditioned by the doctrine of geopolitics to think of national security interests in terms of the relationship between states. But in times of revolutionary change the threat to peace arises out of relationships within the state.

When a totalitarian system collapses, the foundations of states such as Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union are destroyed. Geopolitics is the wrong doctrine for dealing with the situation. It is played like chess and creates a desire to keep the pieces intact.

Geopolitics prides itself on being realistic; as a result, its bias goes unnoticed. Yet that bias can be seen in the attitude of the United States towards the Kurdish and Shia Muslim rebellions in Iraq, and the independence declarations of Slovenia and Croatia. Geopolitics fosters a reactionary attitude to revolutionary change. In situations where such change is desirable it often leads to the wrong policy decisions.

The collapse of the Soviet empire is best understood as a conflict between the center, which embodies the system, and the people, who tend to define themselves in terms of nationality. In the former satellite states of Eastern Europe, the conflict has been resolved in favor of the people: the center has simply abdicated. Not so in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union; there, the revolution has yet to reach its climax.

The conflict between nationalities has received ample attention but the problem of the center is not well understood. Yet the center is the main threat to peace, because it contains the bulk of the military forces, whose main concern, now that the communist system has broken down, is their own survival. That concern remains even if the civilian authority is genuinely interested in economic and political transformation.

That is the case in Yugoslavia. The federal Prime Minister, Ante Markovic, introduced radical economic reforms and established a non-communist political party; but 60 per cent of the federal budget goes to defense, and the democratically elected parliaments of Slovenia and Croatia are unwilling to stay in the federation. In the Soviet Union, there is no progressive civilian authority at the center; rather, the situation is characterized by a confusion of authorities, and a paralysis of the decision-making process.

How should the West respond to Gorbachev’s plea for economic aid? We should recognize that an economic reform program based on the center has little chance of success. The last chance for a progressive center enjoying popular support was lost when the military-industrial complex vetoed the Shatalin Plan. Since then, the prospect for economic and political progress has shifted to the republics. If aid from the West were tied to a central program of economic reform it could easily become counter-productive.

The West would be well advised to offer the Soviet Union a substantial reward for concluding a union treaty. A confederation from which the Baltic states and other republics could secede would be a giant step forward. The West put together a $ 4.3 billion package for Yugoslavia. It did not work because it was tied to maintaining Yugoslavia in its present form, but it gave the West greater influence and may yet forestall a full-scale civil war. A comparable package could benefit the Soviet Union, even if much of it would help sustain a military that would otherwise obstruct peaceful transition.

That transition can only be accomplished at the level of the republics. Specifically, it is too late to create a new monetary system on a union-wide basis. The republics must establish their own central banks before a federal reserve system can be created. In addition, associate status in the International Monetary Fund should be offered, not only to the Soviet Union, but also to the republics.